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How does the Christian Faith Enter Politics – and What 
Does it Do There? 
“Faith-based politics” after the Separation between 
Politics and Religion 
Matthias Möhring-Hesse 
The separation between politics and religion, like its institutional sub-
strate, the separation of Church(es) and State, is a constitutive foundation 
for democratic societies. This is a conviction that democrats, but also theo-
ries of democratic societies, regard as self-evident. “Faith-based politics”, 
i.e., political activities that the actors in question carry out as an expres-
sion and aspect of their faith, therefore stands under the basic suspicion of 
undermining the separation of politics and religion, thereby violating a 
precondition of democratic societies and being “fundamentalist”, at least 
in the sense that, for the political sphere, religion advocates untenable and 
even destructive religious truths. Seen in this way, not only certain forms, 
but every form of politically engaged religion creates problems for demo-
cratic societies, even if such societies may be robust enough to “endure” at 
least the softer variants of this problem and only “suffer” from its hard 
variants. 
By theologically reconstructing “faith-based politics” and by reconcep-
tualizing the separation between politics and religion that is constitutive of 
democratic societies, this paper aims to reject this fundamental suspicion 
of every “faith-based politics” – with the explicit knowledge that political 
debates in democratic societies are indeed burdened by fundamentalist re-
ligions and the religious truths they advocate with a claim to absolute 
truth. First, the separation between politics and religion is grasped as the 
result of a symbolically mediated practice of boundary-drawing carried 
out “from the inside”, in order to avoid a substantialist understanding of 
both politics and religion (1). On this foundation, “faith-based politics” is 
theologically shown to be the practice by which the faithful person mas-
ters the situational challenges of his or her faith through political engage-
ment, i.e., by “doing” politics to confirm and actualize himself or herself 
in it as a faithful person (2). Considering that politics is essentially a pub-
lic event and thus consists primarily of public communications, two essen-
tial pragmatic goals are reconstructed from “faith-based politics” and its 
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secular realization (3). The faithful can realize these two goals only to the 
degree that their religious convictions and attitudes have a prior secular 
meaning and are religiously meaningful convictions and attitudes only on 
this basis (4). 
1. The Separation between Politics and Religion 
In ancient Greece, with the term “politics”, the idea of the political was al-
so “invented”, the idea namely that citizens of a community deal with their 
communal interests and thereby also with the order of their community to-
gether, though conflictually (Meier 1995). The citizens of the Greek city-
states did not separate politics from religion, whereby they had no concept 
of this religion and while religious matters, as understood today, probably 
were not all that important in their politics. Politics arose from and con-
sisted in the citizens’ engaging in it together – and permitting other citi-
zens, though not women, children, or slaves, to engage in their communal 
political activity. As a concept, “religion” arose in another context; name-
ly, in the Roman Empire, it meant the conscientious fulfillment of ritual 
duties – and was thereby an integral component of the Roman social and 
legal order (Wlosok 1970). After Christianity was raised to the state reli-
gion of the Roman Empire, the claim was derived from Christianity that it 
was the sole true religion. But only in early modern times did Christianity, 
including in its self-description, become a religion (Feil 1986). At the 
same time it was denied, from out of the Christian religion, that Christiani-
ty was a religion and thus merely “a work of man”. At the time of their 
“discovery”, at any rate, the two forms of practice, politics and religion, 
did not stand opposite each other and were not separated, and each proba-
bly “possessed” aspects of the other form of practice that was discovered 
elsewhere. 
That these two forms of practice have moved apart is usually presented 
in the separation of Christian Church and State, often using the term “sec-
ularization”. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde’s pertinent and often noted es-
say was not the first to reconstruct the “Entstehung des Staates” (rise of 
the state) as a “Vorgang der Säkularisation” (process of secularization, 
Böckenförde 1991). But the idea that the profane state is the end result of 
a long-lasting process of secularization does not correspond very well with 
the events and developments discussed in the essay (Dreier 2001, 6ff.) – 
and specifically not with those in Germany, either: the emerging nation-
state that is neutral toward religion (or denominations and Churches) was 
How does the Christian Faith Enter Politics – and What Does It Do There? 
103 
based for a very long time on the system in which the ruler picked the 
State Church, a fusion of state rule and religious or Church leadership that 
was especially intense by historical comparison. The image of a religion 
that wrests itself free of the state and that had to withdraw from the mat-
ters integral to the state is not very plausible, considering that the matters 
that we, at least today, grasp under the terms “religion” and “Church” only 
emerged in the separation of Church and State – and thus religion or 
Church and State are simultaneous achievements of historical develop-
ment. 
Even if we can thus doubt that the concept of secularization is a good 
key to understanding the separation of Church and State, we will not 
therefore deny this development, at least not for the countries shaped by 
Christianity. Won in France against the Roman Catholic Church, enforced 
in the United States of America with and for the religious communities, 
and developed in Germany out of confessional splits and struggles, over 
the centuries at the latest, in these countries states developed that monopo-
lize sovereignty and thereby make and can enforce societal decisions – 
and at the end of this development are not only under the rule of law, but 
are also democratically constituted (cf. Cavuldak 2015). To this end, state 
rule – and the medium of implementing rule, the law – were “profaned”, 
i.e., “freed” of religious matters both in their language and in their legiti-
mation; at the same time, the states made themselves neutral toward reli-
gions, religious communities, and Churches respectively present in them. 
The legitimation and orientation of state rule were stripped from the par-
ticular religions and confessions; additionally, the states placed themselves 
at a distance from the communities and Churches representing these reli-
gions and confessions, suppressed at least their direct influence, and in-
stead submitted them to the states’ law and the rule mediated by that law. 
Not least through that, religions became a part of the societies ruled by 
states. With their particular symbolic systems and cognitive specificities, 
with the convictions and attitudes mediated in them and their systematized 
doctrines, and with their particular forms of practice, denominationally 
fragmented Christianity and with it also other religions have “withdrawn” 
to become a particular part of society – and thereby became religions. At 
least in its dominant form, the Christian religion – especially in Germany 
– was represented and shaped by the Christian Churches. In the various 
countries shaped by Christianity, various relations of delimitation and co-
operation emerged between the state, on the one hand, and the Church(es), 
on the other. In distinction especially from the laïcité typical of France, for 
Germany since the Weimar constitution, we speak of a “lagging separa-
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tion” – seeking to grasp with this substantively and semantically unsuita-
ble term the religion-friendly policy of the German state, which awards to 
the Churches and, because these, also to other, if only a few other reli-
gious and ideological communities a high degree of self-administration 
and state privileges, above all the legal status of statutory bodies under 
public law. 
The separation between religion or Churches and State, however, does 
not (yet) show that politics and religion simultaneously stepped apart as 
two different spheres. In order for states to develop on a democratic foun-
dation, first the ancient idea of politics, which had been buried for centu-
ries, had to be taken up again. Though this form of practice did not tally 
with the nation-states of the various countries, it nonetheless had its essen-
tial focus in the state. For only in the state do modern societies have an 
adequately efficacious instrument with which communal interests and the 
order of the respective social relations can be enforced. Since politics is 
therefore related to the state (though not exclusively) and because in poli-
tics an increasing plurality of interests and forms of life, but also of the 
“ultimate truths”, the powerful convictions and values, must be mastered 
and at the same time the claims of deliberative rationality must be served, 
this particular form of practice was profaned through the mutual expecta-
tions of the actors driving it – and the “ultimate truths” were thereby driv-
en out of it in such a way that such “ultimate truths” cannot drive politics, 
at least not successfully. Thus, while the air became thin for “ultimate 
truths” in contexts of political practice, they find outstanding conditions in 
the sphere of religion; and religious communities and especially by the 
Christian Churches took them up, organized them, dogmatized them, and 
– finally – demanded them from the faithful. By setting mutual boundaries 
that they, together, can regard as meaningful, actors separated them step-
by-step and, over a long period, grasped them as two different spheres of 
their symbolically mediated practice or – to use the terminology of Pierre 
Bourdieu – as two different social fields (Bourdieu/Wacquant 1996). Be-
cause they are socialized under the conditions of this separation, actors are 
shaped by the attributions of meaning embedded in politics and religion, 
by what they perceive, and by how they interpret these. By implementing 
these meanings in their practice, they make use of and reproduce the 
boundary-drawing between politics and religion. Actors know when they 
engage in politics and when they implement their religiosity – and know 
how to operate competently, and that means differently, in the two fields 
of politics and religion. 
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This separation between politics and religion thereby remains below the 
level of differentiation that is usually addressed in theories of differentia-
tion. Both politics and religion have their own symbolic systems, their 
own doctrines, and definitely their specific forms of practice. The two 
symbolic systems are not so alien to each other that they can’t be connect-
ed, mediated, and mutually translated. On the contrary, the language of 
politics flows into the field of religion, as one can see in the central con-
cepts precisely of Christian theology, for example the concept of justice. 
But vice versa, as well, actors in the sphere of politics cannot do without 
religious symbols – and this not only when (for example with the term 
“cult of personality”) they want to problematize dislocations in this 
sphere. For example, the term “Creation” has a fixed position in environ-
mental debates, even though it obviously cannot be used without alluding 
to God as the Creator. Despite their separation, politics and religion are 
permeable to each other. 
2. “Faith-based politics” 
Ernst Michel (1689-1964) used the term “faith-based politics” (German: 
“Politik aus dem Glauben”) to designate political engagement that the ac-
tors in question understand as an expression of their Christian faith – in 
such a way that their Christian faith is “preserved” (Michel 1926, 20) in 
these politics. Conceptually, he distanced this engagement from a Catholi-
cally organized politics – and thereby opened the theological access to po-
litical practice of faith through the forms of expression that it had found in 
German social Catholicism. In the following, when the focus is on the 
presence of the faithful in politics and on theologically reconstructing this 
presence under the conditions of the separation of politics and religion, 
Michel’s term will be taken up gladly. The Christian religion in particular 
has a necessarily communitarian dimension, and precisely this communi-
tarian dimension is implemented in the form of practice that is captured in 
“religion” and the sphere delimited as religion. Nonetheless, this approach 
would inappropriately focus theological attention on “only one” of various 
forms of political practice that are intentionally tied to the Christian faith. 
So, in the coming theological reconstruction, it is important to take as 
broad an approach as possible, and that means working from the faith of 
the actors who embody the religion and precisely not from the sphere of 
religion that they jointly “populate”. That is what the term “faith-based 
politics” will stand for in the following. 
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Adherents have both the cognitive and the habitual aspects of faith, i.e., 
specific convictions, certainties, attitudes, and stances (this is the pragmat-
ic premise of the following considerations) as an aspect of their action. 
These aspects do not lie outside of their action – and therefore are also not 
to be understood as something temporally or causally preceding their ac-
tion. The matters designated by the noun “faith” thus exist only as aspects 
of the action designated by the verb “be faithful”. If this verb refers to a 
specific action, one will ascribe it to actors who understand themselves as 
the faithful – and that means who understand themselves as being in a re-
lationship to God and who, through this self-understanding, determine 
who they “are”, including in front of others. Based on this self-
understanding, these actors will interpret their action as faith, and others 
will interpret their action in the same way because of a known or an-
nounced self-understanding. To the degree that the faithful usually don’t 
“invent” their God, but “find Him” in the traditions of Christianity and ap-
propriate ideas about and attitudes toward God that are transmitted in 
those traditions, they understand themselves not only in relation to this 
God, but also – even if not unbrokenly – in relation to Christianity, for 
whose traditions they “can thank” God. 
Understanding oneself in relation to God has a holistic aspect, at least if 
one has gotten to know this God in Christian contexts. The faithful accord-
ingly know themselves to be “entirely” and “always” addressed by this 
God, even if they do not (and cannot) remain aware of this “entirely” and 
“always” either always or as an “entire” person. The holism of the rela-
tionship to God typical of Christianity, however, is not transposed to the 
action that the faithful term “faith”. That God always and entirely address-
es them does not mean that they are faithful always and in all their actions 
– including when they always and unceasingly act as accountable actors. 
With the aid of the “quasi-dialogical” model of action suggested by 
Dietrich Böhler (Böhler 1977), the action termed “faith” can be extracted 
from the stream of the faithful’s action and specified more precisely: ac-
tions are characterized not only through observable operations and the 
goals attributed to them, but also through the situations in which the oper-
ations are observed and interpreted as situations for the attributed goals. 
Both in self-interpretation and in interpretation by others, the relationship 
between situation and actors is thereby two-sided: action situations are 
relevant to actors, whereby it is the actors who perceive, from the perspec-
tive of possible action, which of the circumstances and events surrounding 
them are relevant to them and in this sense “select” the occasions of their 
action. On the other hand, individuals act in situations and thereby react to 
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these situations or to certain aspects of situations that are relevant to them. 
Colloquially, we say that one “ends up in” a situation, that it “happens” to 
or “befalls” us, and that we are “confronted” with it. We thereby express 
that the situation is something that precedes our action (or inaction), but 
that challenges us because it “concerns”, “interests”, or “is relevant to” us 
(Böhler 1985, 252). In their action, actors “answer” situations that they 
first interpret as “questions” and that, in precisely this way, they have con-
stituted as situations of their action. Only by interpreting external condi-
tions or events as “questions” are they provoked to give practical “an-
swers”. “If that is correct, then it may be asserted that both the possible 
genesis and the necessary function of an action, namely to alter, shape, or 
master situations, has a quasi-dialogical structure” (ibid. 257). 
Based on this theory of action, it is possible to gain a specific under-
standing of the faithful’s actions described as “faith”: their action situation 
can make actors see themselves as challenged in their relationship to God 
and thus in their self-understanding as faithful. Based on their self-
understanding, they interpret experiences of their action situations as a 
“question”. Their action can be termed faith if they seek to “answer” such 
“questions” in such a way that in these action situations they live up to to 
their relationship to God and thus realize themselves as faithful. Faith is 
thus the “answer” to such action situations, which the faithful interpret as 
inquiries into their self-understanding as faithful. This concept of faith 
does not address every action of the faithful as faith, because although the 
faithful are always the faithful, they are not always challenged in precisely 
this self-understanding and consequently need not always confirm them-
selves as the faithful in their action. Only such action is addressed as 
“faith” through which the faithful seek to master action situations that 
challenge them as the faithful and therein in their relationship to God – 
and seek to master them in such a way as to confirm their relationship to 
God and through it themselves as faithful (cf. Möhring-Hesse 1997, 83-
206). 
Because faith is tied to a corresponding interpretation of action situa-
tions, others cannot simply interpret the action of the faithful as faith on 
the basis of a known self-understanding. It is not possible to see from the 
outside whether their action is faith, i.e., a practical implementation of 
their relationship to God. Others may have good reasons to arrive at corre-
sponding interpretations of the situation and then to interpret the action of 
the faithful as faith. But ultimately, they depend on receiving correspond-
ing information from the faithful themselves that their action situations 
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address their relationship to God as challenges – and that they themselves 
interpret their action as faith and thereby make it identifiable for others. 
In what religion concretely is for the faithful, they find an outstanding 
site where they are challenged as the faithful in such a way that they must 
confirm themselves in their relationship to God and thus as the faithful. It 
is downright paradigmatic that, in religious services, the faithful urge each 
other to profess their faith and at the same time “accept” this profession. 
But this site does not completely encompass their faith, which is in princi-
ple possible in all sites of differentiated societies and also outside of reli-
gion. In principle, the faithful can be challenged everywhere in their rela-
tionship to God and thus as faithful ones, so that in this situation they must 
confirm themselves as the faithful and only in this way thereby master the 
challenge of precisely these situations – and this even when they are una-
ble to put this challenge into words for the respective others and therefore 
cannot communicate it (Möhring-Hesse 2008; on this, cf. Telser 2013 and 
Kreutzer 2016). 
Contexts of political practice can become this kind of situations, and 
political engagement can become a form for mastering the challenges re-
sulting from them. Then the faithful carry out their political engagement 
as the faithful – and carry out “faith-based politics”. They exert influence 
on the shaping of their social circumstances and “negotiate” these circum-
stances with others – precisely therein confirming themselves in their rela-
tionship to God and realizing themselves as those who have faith in this 
God and who live in hope of Him. As much as this engagement is politics, 
it is equally also faith. This faith is in principle partial, to the degree that 
not all situations of the political engagement of the faithful (must) become 
challenges to their faith and to the degree that their politics need not al-
ways “serve” the implementation of their faith. Politics then serves to se-
cure interests “beyond” the identity as faithful, though even then it is pos-
sible that, on a deeper level of self-interpretation or more fundamental atti-
tudes, this political engagement, too, is understood as an expression of 
their own faith and is correspondingly intended. If “faith-based politics” is 
theologically reconstrued in this way, this does not affect the noted separa-
tion between politics and religion, to the degree that “faith-based politics” 
is political engagement in the social field of politics and faith is therefor 
“outside” the field of religion, even if is not independent of this field. 
At least if one imagines the God hoped for in Christianity as one pre-
sent in human history and pressing for human salvation and if one cannot 
imagine this God except as the salvation intended for all people, one will 
suspect that political contexts not only can become challenges for the 
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faithful and that politics not only can serve to master these challenges. Ra-
ther, one will assume that, for the faithful, politics is very probably a mat-
ter of faith: those of the faithful who understand themselves not only as 
addressees, but also as independent subjects of a salvation for all human-
kind that God brings into human history, will ineluctably “come” into sit-
uations in which they must engage in politics in order to realize them-
selves as the faithful in their relationship to the God who is beneficial for 
all people. In this sense, Edward Schillebeeckx is not the only one who 
rightly speaks of a “political dimension of the Christian faith in God” 
(Schillebeeckx 1987, 92).1 
3. The Pragmatics of Public Faith: Convictions and Becoming Under-
standable 
After politics and religion separated into two different spheres of symboli-
cally mediated forms of practice, “faith-based politics” is situated in a 
special way, namely “placed” in a sphere of politics separated from reli-
gion. In this sphere, actors expect each other to engage in politics, i.e., to 
seek to shape their common social circumstances and to use power to that 
end, thereby mustering at least a certain orientation toward the common 
welfare, willingness to compromise, and other things; but they do not ex-
pect from each other that they intentionally tie their political engagement 
to their faith, and they do not expect that one of them engages in politics 
in order to thereby confirm himself or herself in his or her relationship to 
God and as a faithful person. Unlike the sphere of religion, the actors in 
the sphere of politics do not have joint access to the attitudes and convic-
tions needed to give such a connection between faith and politics meaning; 
nor do they have a common language to create such a meaning. If the 
sphere of politics becomes the situation of Christian faith, then the faithful 
see themselves called upon there to master the challenges of the situation 
and to engage in politics to this end, but that means to fulfill the expecta-
tions and counter-expectations that constitute this sphere. “Faith-based 
                                                          
1  When Schillebeecksx and other theologians speak with great generality of the 
“political dimension” of the Christian faith and identify politics not only as a 
highly probable, but beyond that as a necessary form of carrying out Christian 
faith, then this results from his concept of politics, which is as comprehensive 
as conceivable: politics as the “intense form of societal engagement [...], an 
engagement possible to everyone” (Schillebeeckx 1987, 99). 
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politics” is not excluded from the sphere of politics because of the separa-
tion between politics and religion; but this sphere with all its particularities 
becomes the precondition for “faith-based politics” and limits the possibil-
ities to successfully confirm and realize oneself as one of the faithful 
through politics. 
First, “faith-based politics” can be successful only if the faithful “find” 
ends and means with which they can master the problems and dislocations 
that they experience as challenges to their faith. If they see themselves 
challenged as the faithful by, for example, discrimination, hostilities, or 
curtailments by people in the narrower or broader surroundings, for exam-
ple because of the “option for the poor” inherent in their faith, and if they 
arrive at the conviction that the only suitable way to answer this challenge 
is to change their social circumstances, then they must “find” the politics 
with which they can strive for this change; and they must also explore the 
respective political field and establish themselves as political actors in this 
field – in the best case, together with others who have the same or similar 
convictions. In the political engagement thus “found”, they master the sit-
uational challenge and thereby successfully confirm themselves as the 
faithful – and this, whether or not their engagement is also politically suc-
cessful and they are able to enforce the projected changes together with 
others and against yet again others. However, the change intended with 
“faith-based politics” depends on precisely this political success, for 
which reason this success, too, lies in the intention of “faith-based poli-
tics”. With the exception of situations of extreme injustice, in which polit-
ical resistance can become a question of one’s own authenticity, political 
success also lies in the intention of “faith-based politics” – and, along with 
the successful confirmation of the faithful as the faithful, it is thereby their 
second, as if outward-directed criterion of success. 
Since its invention in Greek Antiquity, politics has been a decisive 
communicative enterprise: one engages in politics through the public “ex-
change” of opinions and their justifications. In this way, political actors 
persuade others; they collectivize their interest situations and their repre-
sentation or they come to compromise agreements with others and thus 
bring themselves into accord. One way or another, they gain power and 
thereby increase their chance to prevail with their own interests over oth-
ers. All attempts to generalize particular interests through general rights 
and thereby to identify intended changes as just are dependent on public 
communication. The faithful (too) will successfully engage only to the de-
gree that they are successful in the communicative processes that consti-
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tute politics. Two types of communication intentions can be distinguished 
that pragmatically determine “faith-based politics”. 
If the intention of the faithful is to realize themselves as the independ-
ent subject of the salvation irrupting into human history from God, for ex-
ample by redressing discrimination, limitations, and dislocations and by 
arranging their social circumstances differently, then they must convince 
the respective other actors in the respective political field that the project-
ed changes are in the general interest of all and in this sense are just or that 
they lie in the common interest at least in some sense. The precondition 
for their being able to convince this or that other person is that they are 
understood with their expressions and justifications of their political opin-
ions. The others must therefore be able to deduce the meanings of the ex-
pressed opinions and reasons, i.e., they must also, for example, know what 
interests they have, if the claimed generality or at least the claimed com-
monality of interests is true. Only on the basis of such understanding is it 
possible for others to be convinced by reasons, to agree through insight to 
the politically pursued changes, and, convinced in this way, to engage in 
politics in the same direction. And only on the basis of mutual understand-
ing is it conceivable that political actors spur each other on with opinions 
and reasons and “negotiate” a common politics. Consequently, “faith-
based politics” is pragmatic only when and to the degree that it can, first, 
make itself, its intended changes, and their justification understandable for 
other actors in the political field in order to be able then to convince the 
respective others. 
The requirement to make themselves understandable already makes it 
necessary, in political communication, for believers to use a language that 
abstains from the particularities of their faith and to transcend attitudes 
and convictions that can be plausible only in the context of their faith. To 
the degree that they thus cannot use the language that, after the separation 
between religion and politics, is “given” only in the sphere of religion, and 
to the degree that they must transcend precisely those convictions and atti-
tudes that “have” meanings at least there, the faithful engage in the secular 
communication that constitutes the sphere of politics. 
A second intention typical of the faithful in the public communication 
they conduct in the sphere of politics is less ambitious: they can want to 
make their “faith-based politics” so understandable that other political ac-
tors understand why these politics are an expression of their faith and 
thereby “essential to faith”. Here, their intention is not to convince others 
of their politics. Rather, others are to be familiarized with the intentionali-
ty of their political engagement and with the “seriousness” and “urgency” 
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inherent in it. To this end, they must not only make it understandable to 
their addressees what changes they seek to have prevail and for what rea-
sons; beyond that, they must make it understandable that, with these poli-
tics, they are answering matters that challenge them in their faith and that 
with these politics they seek to master these challenges and precisely 
thereby to confirm themselves in their faith. They do not need to speak 
completely and comprehensively about their faith, but they do need to 
speak enough about it that others can understand what it means to believe 
something and to be challenged in this faith by the respectively discussed 
matters in the world that are “outside” of the religion – and this, even if 
the others do not share this faith and cannot even understand why believ-
ers “have” this faith. The faithful will not be able to do this entirely with-
out borrowing from the language of their faith and entirely without refer-
ring to the convictions and attitudes that are part of their faith. But they 
must put all of this into a secular language understandable to those who do 
not know this language of faith and who do not share these attitudes and 
convictions – and who are able, from what they can also understand, to fill 
with meanings the “islands” of what they don’t understand. A prominent 
example of this kind of communication is the social encyclical “Laudato 
si´” (2015), in which Pope Francis not only makes the case for an ecologi-
cal-social transformation and offers a secular environmental ethics, but at 
the same time also wants to make known a religious, unsecularizable eth-
ics of Creation and spirituality from which the faithful view the lasting 
concern about the shared planet Earth as a matter of their faith and conse-
quently “take” corresponding engagement as the practice of their faith. 
To make oneself understandable in these two ways is not a precondition 
for being permitted to engage in secular discourse in the field of politics, 
as it was treated, starting with John Rawls and Robert Audi, in the Anglo-
American debate about the secular justification of religious citizens (on 
this, cf. Schmidt 2001). It is simply a pragmatic condition of their partici-
pation in political discourses and the communicative representation of 
their “faith-based politics”. To make oneself understandable is an imposed 
“constraint” only in that it is the precondition for successfully taking part 
in public negotiating processes in the sphere of politics. To make oneself 
understandable in the public representation of “faith-based politics”, how-
ever, is also a question of competence, as Jürgen Habermas discussed in 
his essay “Religion in the Public Sphere”. If they propound their “faith-
based politics” in the sphere of politics, believers must be able to make 
themselves understandable with their opinions and reasons and additional-
ly to “step outside” the language specialized for their faith but available 
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only in the sphere of religion. Habermas’ implication that religious actors 
do not start out with this competence and that secular citizens are more 
skillful at least in public justification is rather improbable in the federal 
German context. The common and in this sense secular language in which 
political citizens can make themselves understood is namely not prede-
fined by the separation between politics and religion. It does not result un-
til there are processes of public negotiation in which actors not only “ex-
change” their opinions and reasons, but must also jointly “find” the lan-
guage in which this exchange succeeds. That unreligious and in this sense 
secular citizens can be presumed to have it easier in this cannot be recog-
nized, especially since they face similar “identitarian” and thus similarly 
structured challenges as religious citizens do to make themselves under-
standable with their politics. In addition, not only the unreligious, but also 
religious actors have carried out and still carry out the separation between 
politics and religion through symbolically mediated practice, so that this 
separation and consequently also the “rules of the game” of politics are as 
familiar (or unfamiliar) to the one group as to the other. Because the faith-
ful are socialized politically and religiously under the same conditions of 
the separation between politics and religion, one should assume that be-
lievers can propound also their “faith-based politics” competently, and 
that means in a generally understandable way and in this sense secularly. 
4. The Priority of Secular over Religious Meaning 
Matters that the faithful experience “beyond” their religion as challenges 
to their faith are shaped by their historical context, and, precisely in this 
shaping, become challenges to the faithful that they “must” master through 
the particular form of practice of politics. What the faithful experience as 
challenges is thus already previously charged with meanings and becomes 
challenges to their faith with precisely these prior meanings – and beyond 
that, becomes religiously significant. In this case, too, what Edward Schil-
lebeeckx (1914-2009) identified as fundamental for religious meaning and 
thereby also for revelation holds true: namely, that every “religious mean-
ing of a worldly process [...] presupposes a human meaning” (Schille-
beeckx 1990, 29). If historical matters, for example discrimination of, hos-
tilities toward, or the limitations placed on people, are interpreted as chal-
lenges to one’s own faith, then these matters are attributed a religious 
meaning and they are “asserted” to be relevant for the relationship be-
tween God and the people He considers with benevolence. This religious 
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interpretation of historical matters presupposes that these were previously 
interpreted as important matters “without direct relationship to God – ‘etsi 
Deus non daretur’” (ibid.) – and in this sense as secular. Without prior 
secular meaning, however, the asserted religious meaning of the practice 
of “faith-based politics”, namely the challenge to faith and the mastery of 
this challenge through political engagement, is invalid; but then “faith-
based politics” is senseless secularly as well as religiously. 
Historical matters prove to be secularly important under the conditions 
of their respective context of meaning – and thereby, in political questions 
in public communication, in the sphere of politics. That people are dis-
criminated against, are subjected to hostility, and are curtailed in relation 
to others, that they are denied comparable rights and full inclusion in their 
social contexts, and that this is injustice against them – this and other 
things emerge if the corresponding assertions and their justifications can 
hold up in public communications. In political contexts, therefore, the 
“human meaning” (which is the precondition for religious meaning) 
emerges in public communication, or fails there. Thus, the picture usually 
drawn is veritably reversed: only in political debates do secular meanings 
develop which then become a challenge to the faith of believers and in this 
sense can become religiously meaningful. Because matters in the sphere of 
politics become (“are made”) meaningful, they can also become meaning-
ful for believers, also in a special way for their faith, i.e. religiously mean-
ingful. So religion is not the first thing, which is then laboriously translat-
ed into the second, politics; rather, politics is the first thing that, for be-
lievers, becomes a problem in their faith and thereby religiously meaning-
ful. Thus, “faith-based politics” does not initially format itself politically 
in religion, but in politics – and thus in precisely the opposite way from 
how it is drawn in the aforementioned debate about the secular justifica-
tion of religious citizens, as well as by Habermas in his reconstruction of 
the public presence of the religious. 
For the faithful, the priority of secular over religious meaning need nei-
ther always, nor necessarily manifest itself in a corresponding temporal 
sequence. Temporally, believers can thus definitely experience politically 
relevant matters as challenges for their faith and then “choose” political 
engagement to master them – and only “tread” the sphere of politics 
through this engagement and “participate” in the meaning jointly found 
there. But in these cases, as well, they must reproduce the priority of secu-
lar meaning – and, in the sphere of politics, they must ensure that the chal-
lenges to their faith and that the “faith-based politics” chosen to master 
these challenges have corresponding secular meanings. To put a fine point 
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on it: believers ensure the justice of “faith-based politics” in political dis-
courses, i.e., in the sphere of politics and not in the sphere of religion – 
and this justice is the precondition that enables their politics to be valid as 
the practice of their faith and thereby as “faith-based politics”, also in the 
sphere of religion and in relation to their brothers and sisters in faith in the 
religious language available to them in common. 
Social-ethical literature often finds it interesting (as does Habermas, as 
well, in his essay “Religion in the Public Sphere”) that, via the political 
engagement of the faithful, religious orientations inspiringly enter politics, 
open new perspectives or alternatives to well-trodden paths there, or ena-
ble previously blocked agreements. Orientations that are available only in 
religious language and that are interwoven with the attitudes and convic-
tions characteristic of religions flow, via “faith-based politics”, into poli-
tics – and have beneficial effects there. This “direction of flow” of mean-
ings need not be excluded because of the priority of secular over religious 
meaning. Even if the religious meaning of politically relevant matters can-
not be had without their secular meaning, these two different attributions 
of meaning will have mutual influence, so that not only will secular mean-
ing shape religious meaning, but also vice versa: religious meaning will 
shape secular meaning. But even if, through “faith-based politics”, reli-
gious orientations exert influence on the meanings discovered in politics 
of politically relevant matters, their religious meaning is decided by their 
ability to flow into the politically found meanings – and thereby in this 
context their ability to “gain” a secular meaning. But regarding this as a 
process of secularization does not grasp it well: if religious orientations 
gain a secular meaning, they are precisely not subsumed in this secular 
meaning. On the contrary: in relation to the secular meaning discovered in 
politics, there is a “surplus” of meaning in “faith-based politics” that the 
politically significant matters “have” for believers in their relationship to 
God. 
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